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TYPICALITY IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICAL PHYSICS
AND BORN’S RULE
DETLEF DU¨RR AND WARD STRUYVE
Abstract. Typicality has always been in the minds of the founding fathers of probabil-
ity theory when probabilistic reasoning is applied to the real world. However, the role of
typicality is not always appreciated. An example is the paper “Foundations of statistical
mechanics and the status of Born’s rule in de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory” by Antony
Valentini [1], where he presents typicality and relaxation to equilibrium as distinct ap-
proaches to the proof of Born’s rule, while typicality is in fact an overriding necessity.
Moreover the “typicality approach” to Born’s rule of “the Bohmian mechanics school” is
claimed to be inherently circular. We wish to explain once more in very simple terms
why the accusation is off target and why “relaxation to equilibrium” is neither necessary
nor sufficient to justify Born’s rule.
Nino Zangh`ı and D.D. remember vividly the discussions with GianCarlo Ghirardi on Boltz-
mann’s insights into statistical physics and its relation to the random theory he himself
had proposed (with his coworkers) and had worked on for many decades until his untimely
death. Not only was GianCarlo an admirer of Boltzmann, he also had a full grasp of
Boltzmann’s ideas and on the role of typicality. The GRW theory is intrinsically random
and the |ψ|2-distribution arises from the collapse mechanism built into the theory and he
understood that the appeal to typicality, for empirical assertions, cannot be avoided. We
miss GianCarlo Ghirardi, our invaluable friend, coworker and colleague and we dedicate
this work in memoriam to him.
1. Why “most” cannot be avoided
Typicality has always been in the minds of the founding fathers of probability theory
when probabilistic reasoning is applied to the real world. Nevertheless, still it’s role is often
not understood. An example is [1], where Valentini presents typicality and relaxation to
equilibrium as distinct approaches to the proof of Born’s rule, while typicality is in fact an
overriding necessity. Valentini writes in the abstract of his article:
We compare and contrast two distinct approaches to understanding the Born
rule in de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory, one based on dynamical relax-
ation over time (advocated by this author and collaborators) and the other
based on typicality of initial conditions (advocated by the ‘Bohmian mechan-
ics’ school). It is argued that the latter approach is inherently circular and
physically misguided.
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The accusation of circularity concerns the proof of Born’s rule in de Broglie-Bohm pilot-
wave theory, or “Bohmian mechanics” for short, given in [2]. It is an important proof, as
it explains the observed regularity concerning the outcomes of measurements on ensembles
of identically prepared systems. As such, Valentini’s accusation is at the same time an
onslaught to the ideas underlying statistical physics. We wish to explain once more in
very simple terms why the accusation is off target and why “relaxation to equilibrium” is
neither necessary nor sufficient to justify Born’s rule.
In the history of mathematics pointing out circularities in important proofs have been
sometimes pathbreaking. An example is provided by what we would call now the “PhD
thesis” of Georg Simon Klu¨gel (1739 - 1812), who showed that all existing proofs (about
27 of them) of the 11th Postulate of Euclid on the uniqueness of parallels were circular in
that they used in the proofs equivalents of the postulate as (hidden) assumptions. That
thesis has led to the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry!
The accusation of circularity in the derivation of Born’s rule is however less breathtaking;
it is simply off target. The criticism misses the point of statistical physics entirely. That
may be partly due to the loose manner of speaking about probability and distributions
which is common in statistical physics and which clouds the meaning of these objects.
Instead, the notion of typicality is necessary to understand what the statistical predictions
of a physical theory really mean. In fact, typicality (though the word may not have been
directly used) has always been in the minds of probabilists and physicists (from Jacob
Bernoulli ∼ 1700 over Ludwig Boltzmann ∼ 1850 to Kolmogorov’s axiomatics of probability
∼ 1930 ) when probabilistic reasoning is applied to the real world. We try to explain once
more in simplest terms why this need be.
Let’s start with a simple example: A (fair) coin is thrown, say, a thousand times (the
number thousand is chosen only because it is kind of large). We obtain a head-tail sequence
of length 1000 and ask prior to inspection of the sequence: Roughly how many heads are
there in the sequence? Some would perhaps prefer to be agnostic about the answer but
most would say – perhaps after some time of reflection – that the number will be roughly
500. Actually they will find out by counting the heads that they were right. Why roughly
500? Well, the relative frequency of heads (or tails) is then 1/2, the probability1 which we
naturally assign for the sides of a (fair) coin. What matters here is that there is obviously
some relation between the factual occurrence of the relative frequency of heads and the
number 1/2. That needs to be explained. Why? Because other sequences are possible as
well, for example sequences which show less than 300 heads. The question which needs to
be answered is: Why don’t they show up in practice? The (mathematical) way that the
regularity of roughly 500 heads is explained is by the law of large numbers (LLN), which
establishes the closeness of the empirical distribution of heads, i.e., the distribution which
counts the relative frequency of heads in the sequence of length 1000 (which is the large
number in the LLN) and the number 1/2.
1Luckily, for what we have to say here, we can ignore the issues related to the question what the notion
of “probability 1/2” really means. It does not matter.
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How does the LLN explain that? By counting sequences! Here are some telling numbers:
There are about 10300 sequences with about 500 heads. There are about 10260 sequences
with about 300 heads. So the proportion of sequences with 500 heads versus 300 heads is
about 1040. For sharpening our intuition about the power of such numbers note that the age
of the universe in seconds is about 1017. Thus most2 sequences show a law-like regularity,
namely that the relative number of heads is roughly 1/2. Wouldn’t that suggest that it is
most likely that the observed sequence has roughly equal numbers of heads and tails? Well,
most likely is just another way of saying “with high probability”. But then, what does
probability mean here? It is better and simpler to say that the typical sequences will have
roughly 500 heads. The LLN says nothing more than that. It is a typicality statement.
We remark for later that in introductory courses to probability theory the counting is
introduced as Laplace probability which is then a normalized quantity by dividing the
numbers of sequences of interest by the total number of sequences and which we better
refer to by the role it plays in our example as Laplace-typicality. The point of this example
is that mere counting of head-tail sequences (or 0 − 1 sequences if one wants) gives two
insights (where the second one we take it as being intuitively clear without going into
details):
1. Most sequences show the law-like regularity that the empirical distribution of heads
(the relative frequency of heads) is near 1/2.
2. The succession of heads and tails (or 1′s and 0′s) in a typical sequence looks random,
unpredictable, while randomness never entered. It’s just the way typical sequences
look like.
Agnostics may still complain that that explains nothing: What needs to be explained is why
we only see typical sequences! That’s actually the deep question underlying the meaning
of probability theory from its very beginning and Antoine-Augustin Cournot (1801-1877)
coined once what became known as Cournot’s principle, which in our own rough words
just says that we should only be concerned with typical events. The point we wish to make
with the simple example is that appeal to typicality cannot be avoided. Sequences with
drastically unequal number of heads and tails are physically possible. The reason they do
not appear in practice is because there are much too few of them, they are atypical. There
is no way around that. That is what the founders of probability theory understood and
had to swallow. Note that typicality, through Cournot’s principle, only tells us what to
expect or not. It does not allow to associate a probability to, say, the sequence with 300
heads: In terms of the Laplace-typicality only values near zero or one matter – atypical or
typical. The notion of typicality is distinct from the notion of probability.
Let’s go a step further and consider the coin tossing as a physical process, because that
is what it is after all: There is a hand which tosses the coin, thereby providing the coin
with an initial momentum and position which determine its flight through the air. The
trajectory of the coin is determined, given the initial conditions, by the laws of physics
(here Newtonian) and hence it defines a function which maps initial conditions to head or
tail (0 or 1). But the hand is just a physical system itself – a coin tossing machine so to
2“Most” should be understood as “overwhelmingly many”.
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say. The machine picks up the coin, throws it, and after the landing the machine notes
down head or tail, picks the coin up again, throws it and so on and so forth. Thus the
resulting sequence of heads and tails depends only on the initial conditions, i.e., on the
phase space point which determines the whole process of the coin tossing machine. The
physical description and analysis may not be that easy, but at least the principle is clear3:
It shows that the head-tail-sequences are the images of a function F = (F1, . . . , FN ) of the
high dimensional phase space4 variables q – the initial conditions. Here the component
Fk maps to the outcome δ ∈ {0, 1} of the kth tossing of the machine. Such a function
F (a coarse-graining function by the way) is usually called a random variable. The point
is that in this description where phase space variables play the decisive role, counting is
not anymore possible, as classical phase space is a continuum. What then replaces the
counting? That is a measure – a typicality measure. In classical physics, which would be
appropriate for studying coin tossing as a physical process, the measure commonly used is
the “Liouville-measure” – the volume measure in phase space. It recommends itself by the
property of being stationary,5 an observation which was promoted in the works of Ludwig
Boltzmann. It is a measure which is suggested by the physical law itself and not by an
arbitrary human choice. The fact that, with this measure, typicality is a timeless notion
is of great help for proving the LLN.
The role of the Liouville-measure is to define the notion of “most” for the phase space
of classical mechanics. In mathematical terms, the above mentioned Laplace-typicality
emerges then ideally as the image measure of the more fundamental Liouville-measure
defined by the function F . To express the LLN in this more fundamental setting, it is
useful to introduce the empirical distribution ρNemp(q, δ), the function which counts the
relative number of heads and tails and which is a function of the phase space variables q
and the image variables δ ∈ {0, 1}.
ρNemp(q, δ) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
1{δ}(Fk(q)) .
Here 1{δ}(Fk(q)) = 1 if Fk(q) = δ and 0 otherwise. The LLN (if it would be proven for a
physically realistic coin tossing machine) would then say something like:6
For most phase points q (w.r.t. the Liouville-measure) and for large enough N the empirical
distribution ρNemp ≈ 1/2, or, Liouville-measure typically ρ
N
emp ≈ 1/2.
3For more on this, see the chapter “Chance in Physics” in [3].
4Dimension of the size of Avogadro’s number perhaps.
5In classical mechanics, there are many more measures which share this property, but that does not
matter for our concerns here.
6A technical remark on the side: To model the coin tossing experiment in which the coin is thrown
a great number of times in a physically realistic way is not so easy and to prove the LLN may turn out
hard: The stochastic independence of the different tosses of the coin is easily said, but to prove that in a
physically realistic model is far from being easy (see [3], chapter “Chance in Physics” for an elaboration on
that).
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The reference to typicality cannot be avoided, as there are phase points which are
mapped to sequences with, say, 300 heads, i.e., “most” cannot be replaced by “all”.
One further point should be noted which is often used to actually justify the use of
statistical methods in physics: It is almost impossible to know in a realistic physical system
exactly which initial conditions lead to which outcomes (as for example in the case of the
coin tossing machine). The power of typicality is that exact details are not needed. It
suffices that for most initial conditions the observed statistical regularities obtain.
Coin tossing is not a process which happens only here and now but which happens at
arbitrary locations and times. To explain the statistical regularities in such generality, we
still need to lift the whole discussion to a universal level. The universally relevant LLN
would then have to say (very) roughly something like:
For most universes in which coin tossing experiments are done, i.e., for Liouville measure-
typical such universes, it is the case that the empirical distribution of heads in long enough
sequences in coin tossing experiments is approximately 1/2.
The typicality assertion concerning Born’s law is very analogous to this and has been
proven in [2]. Before we turn to that we shortly look at another rather simple classical
system. Everything that will be said for this example can be carried over to the case of
Bohmian mechanics.
Consider an ideal gas of point particles in a rectangular box, lets say with elastic col-
lisions of the particles at the walls. The gas is in equilibrium when the gas molecules fill
the box approximately homogeneously. Most configurations (with respect to the Liouville-
typicality measure) are like that, like most 0, 1-sequences have about equal numbers of
heads and tails. In the course of time, there will be fluctuations of the number of molecules
in a given region in the box, but those will escape our gross senses. Most configurations
will stay in equilibrium over time. Now suppose we start with a gas that is occupying only
one half of the box, the other half being empty. This would count as a non-equilibrium
configuration. What will happen in the course of time? Well, eventually the gas molecules
will fill the box approximately homogeneously. Will this relaxation happen for any pos-
sible configuration of gas that starts in one half of the box? The answer is no. For our
simple example one can easily construct configurations which will never look like the equi-
librium ones. There will be configurations for which it takes an enormous amount of time
to evolve into ones which look like equilibrium. And some never will. Why is that im-
portant to observe? Because if one wants to make predictions about the possible behavior
non-equilibrium configurations one needs to invoke typically. Namely, the idea (which is
Boltzmann’s insight) is that typical, i.e., most, non-equilibrium configurations will evolve
to configurations which macroscopically look like equilibrium ones. (“Most” is again with
respect to the Liouville-typicality measure, concentrated initially on the very small subset
of configurations which are such that the box is only half filled.) Why? Because the equi-
librium set in phase space, is so overwhelmingly larger then the tiny non-equilibrium set,
so that typically trajectories will wander around and will end up in the overwhelmingly
large set and stay there for a very large time. And, as we said, there exist also atypical
configurations which will not at all behave like that. That is, without typicality, we have no
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explanation why to expect equilibration. Having said this, we should warn the reader that
this just is the physical idea behind the equilibration. To turn this into a rigorous argument
is famously hard, as hard as to justify the Boltzmann equation from first principles.
The warning in mind, we can think of describing the transition from non-equilibrium
to equilibrium also in terms of coarse-graining densities ρ(x, t), which are more or less
smooth functions (macro-variables) on the three-dimensional physical space with variables
x and which should be pictured as approximations of empirical densities.7 The uniform
density i.e., ρeq(x) = const. would then be the equilibrium density. Hence, starting with a
non-equilibrium density ρneq, it is perhaps reasonable to assume, that ρneq(t) → ρeq as t
gets large. This convergence of densities is sometimes referred to as “mixing property” and
we shall refer to this notion to mean just that: convergence of densities without reference
to typicality. There have been attempts to show this. The mixing idea is presumably due
to Willard Gibbs who had introduced the so-called ensemble view into statistical physics.
An idea for a strategy for a “convergence to equilibrium proof” was suggested by Paul
Ehrenfest as is recalled on page 85 by Marc Kac in [4] and where he refers to Ehrenfest’s
attempt as an “amusing” theorem, since convergence to equilibrium in time does not follow
at all from what Ehrenfest had shown.
But even when the mixing property, i.e., convergence of densities, were shown to be of
physical relevance, the connection with the actual configuration (i.e., the empirical distribu-
tion) would still have to be established. After all, Newtonian physics is about configurations
and not densities. In addition, by our arguments above, some non-equilibrium densities
will never show the mixing property, for example densities which are concentrated on “bad”
configurations, i.e., atypical ones.
2. Born’s Rule
What we have said about the statistical analysis in classical physics carries over to
the statistical analysis of Bohmian mechanics, where the phase space is now replaced by
configuration space. Born’s rule ρ = |ψ|2 is a short hand for the universal LLN for the
empirical distribution ρNemp of the coordinates of the particles of subsystems in an ensemble
(defined similarly as in footnote 7). Roughly speaking, the universal LLN in the context
of Born’s rule says the following (for the precise formulation, see e.g. [2]):
For typical Bohmian universes hold: In an ensemble of (identical) subsystems of a universe,
where each subsystem has effective wave function8 ψ, the empirical distribution ρNemp of
the particles coordinates of the subsystems are |ψ|2 distributed.
For this to hold sufficiently well, the number N of subsystems in the ensemble should
be large. Note that in analogy with the coin tossing, the number 1/2 is here replaced by
|ψ|2 and the sequence of length 1000 is here the number of subsystems in the ensemble.
But instead of the Liouville-measure, the typicality measure used in [2] is the measure
7The empirical density is in this case given by ρNemp(q,x) =
1
N
∑
N
k=1
δ(x− xi), where xi is the position
of the ith particle. Note the analogy with the definition in the case of the coin tossing.
8Think of this wave function as the usual wave function of a system as it is used in physics courses.
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P
Ψ(A) =
∫
A
|Ψ|2(q)dq (q is a generic configuration space variable), where A is a subset of
the configuration space of the Bohmian universe and Ψ is the universal wave function on
that space.9 What is special about the typicality measure PΨ? It is a measure which is
transported equivariantly by the Bohmian flow. This means that it is a typicality measure
which like the stationary Liouville measure is independent of time.10
The very nice property of the universal quantum equilibrium LLN is that it is empirically
adequate. Up to date all tests affirm the empirical validity of Born’s law.
3. Dynamical Relaxation?
Valentini dislikes the use of typicality. Instead, he proposes “dynamical relaxation”
to equilibrium to explain Born’s rule in the realm of Bohmian mechanics. It is however
not at all clear what is meant by “dynamical relaxation” and in which way reference to
typicality can be overcome. On the configurational level, i.e., on the level of empirical
densities, starting in non-equilibrium our discussion of the gas in the box applies verbatim.
There will always exist initial configurations of particles for which the empirical distribution
will never become close to |ψ|2 – the equilibrium distribution. So why should we expect
equilibrium then? Appealing to Boltzmann’s idea, one could invoke typicality as in the
case of the gas example. But as soon as one invokes typicality, there is no longer any need
to invoke relaxation to begin with to explain equilibrium! Namely, most configurations
will be in equilibrium most of the time and hence non-equilibrium just doesn’t occur–for
all practical purposes – as established in [2].
Valentini also follows the Gibbs-Ehrenfest idea of mixing and provides an analytic ar-
gument for the convergence of densities. But the argument is the direct analogue of the
“amusing” theorem proven by Ehrenfest, which “tells us nothing about the behavior of
the non-equilibrium density ρ in time” [4]. Not to say that the connection to empirical
densities needs to be established on top of that.
Hence the “dynamical relaxation” approach turns out be neither necessary nor sufficient.
4. Physically misguided?
All of the quantum formalism follows from Born’s rule [5].11 There is no dispute about
that. Heisenberg’s uncertainty follows from Born’s rule. No dispute about that either.
There is actually no dispute about any of the consequences which arise from or in quantum
equilibrium. So what is the dispute about then? If it is about the needed reference
to typicality, then that can’t be because both “approaches” need reference to typicality
anyhow for physically meaningful assertions.
9As an aside, note that the typicality measure which is used in the LLN is really a member of an
equivalence set of measures. That is, all measures which are absolutely continuous with respect to PΨ yield
a LLN for Born’s law.
10It has been proven under very reasonable conditions in [6] that this measure is unique.
11This involves in some way or another an analysis of measurement situations, which in Bohmian me-
chanics is straightforward, and which in let’s say orthodox quantum theory needs the problematical collapse
of the wave function.
8 DETLEF DU¨RR AND WARD STRUYVE
What then makes the use of typicality physically misguided? Because the physical law
allows for atypical universes? Because a coin tossing sequence of only heads is possible
by the physical law? No argument, other than denying the physical law, can make those
possibilities impossible. Why then, don’t we deny the law to make them go away? Because
by humbly looking at the facts in our world we understand that the law-like regularities
in apparently random events are in surprising harmony with the physical law: They are
typical.
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